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Притягнення держав до відповідальності за авіаційний тероризм
Протягом минулого століття у мирний час цивільна авіація ставала об’єктом міжнародного 
авіаційного тероризму майже 600 разів. Це пояснюється стратегічним значенням авіації для 
міждержавних зв’язків, масштабами негативного економічного, політичного та соціального впливу 
актів авіаційного тероризму на декілька держав одразу та резонансом, який вони можуть викли-
кати у світі. Саме тому запровадження ефективних засобів протидії цьому злочину стає дедалі 
актуальнішим для світової авіаційної системи та гарантування миру і безпеки в цілому.
Як зазначила Рада Безпеки ООН у Резолюції 2178, невиконання державами їхніх міжнарод-
них зобов’язань у сфері  боротьби з тероризмом  має наслідком зростання у них рівня радикалі-
зації і посилення відчуття безкарності. Держави здатні  сприяти вчиненню актів міжнародного 
авіаційного тероризму , зокрема, шляхом їх організації, підтримки поведінки терористичних угру-
повань, а також через неспроможність або небажання попереджувати злочини або карати вин-
них. У свою чергу, встановлення міжнародної відповідальності держав за участь у авіаційному 
тероризмі є одним із факторів стримування міжнародного тероризму в цілому. 
У статті  досліджуються особливості притягнення держав до міжнародної відповідально-
сті за їх причетність до тероризму в сфері цивільної авіації. Зокрема, визначаються основні 
зобов’язання, які накладаються на державу в питаннях, пов’язаних з авіаційним тероризмом, 
аналізуються ключові аспекти атрибуції акту авіаційного тероризму державі і способи реалізації 
відповідальності держави.
Міжнародні зобов’язання держав, які пов’язані з міжнародним тероризмом, об’єднано у дві 
групи: зобов’язання за загальним міжнародним правом та зобов’язання, що визначені у рамках 
боротьби з тероризмом. Першу групу склали: незастосування сили та погрози силою, невтру-
чання у внутрішні справи держав, заборона агресії; другу – попередження актів міжнародного 
тероризму, покарання винних за злочини тероризму в сфері авіації, співробітництво та вирішення 
спорів мирним шляхом.
Для притягнення держави до відповідальності за авіаційний тероризм необхідно довести, що 
діяння, яке порушує одне з вказаних зобов’язань, ставиться у провину цій державі. Саме тому 
у статті аналізуються підстави атрибуції діяння (дії чи бездіяльності) державі: активна участь 
держави у вчиненні злочину, підтримка або контроль осіб, які вчиняють злочин (у контексті 
цивільної авіації ця підстава атрибуції має набагато нижчий поріг контролю, ніж визначений 
у праві міжнародної відповідальності держав – т. з. правило «прихильності або підтримки» 
(«harbor or support» rule)), визнання та прийняття поведінки таких осіб, ужиття надмірних 
заходів у боротьбі з тероризмом (такі заходи мають розглядатися у рамках міжнародного права 
прав людини).
У випадках, коли наявні обидва елементи, необхідні для настання міжнародної відповідально-
сті держави, остання може бути притягнута до відповідальності шляхом закликання до відпові-
дальності або зверненням постраждалої держави до контрзаходів.   
Ключові слова: міжнародний тероризм; авіаційний тероризм; тероризм у сфері цивіль-
ної авіації; міжнародна відповідальність держав; порушення міжнародних зобов’язань держави; 
атрибуція міжнародно-протиправних діянь державі; імплементація міжнародної відповідально-
сті держави.
Statement of the problem and relevance of the topic. Civil aviation is an easy, 
dramatic and newsworthy target for terrorists [1, p. 51]. Due to the global character 
of this industry, states of all regions are potentially vulnerable to interference with 
their air transportation systems. These interferences, in their turn, may affect the 
interests of several countries at a time and draw more attention than any other 
kind of terrorism. A single incident of aviation terrorism may cause hundreds 
of deaths, destroy equipment worth hundreds of millions of dollars and have a 
dramatic negative impact on the world economy, public confidence in air travel, 
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choice of destinations and airlines and the common perception of the everyday 
world. Therefore, civil aviation has been chosen as an effective stepping-stone for 
the achievement of terrorists’ goals.
As it has been noticed by the United Nations Security Council (hereinafter – 
UNSC) in Resolution 2178, states’ non-compliance with their counter-terrorism 
international obligations contributes to the increase in radicalization and fosters a 
sense of impunity [2, preamble]. In particular, states contribute to the commission 
of acts of aviation terrorism through the organization of such acts, support of 
somebody’s conduct and failure to prevent or to punish perpetrators. Thus, bringing 
states to justice for their involvement in aviation terrorism is one of the deterrents 
of international terrorism as a whole.
Analysis of recent research and publications. In spite of the profound impact 
that the aviation industry has on international relations, international peace and 
stability, a little attention has been devoted to state responsibility for aviation 
terrorism. Instead, scholars have mainly been considering opportunities for holding 
states responsible for international terrorism (K. Trapp, V. Proulx, T. Becker). As 
regards matters of aviation terrorism, J. Duchesneau provided a comprehensive 
framework of this crime and its implications in various contexts. 
With a brief consideration having being given by foreign doctrine and scarce 
attention of Ukrainian doctrine (only V. Antypenko devoted his attention to 
responsibility for international terrorism [3, pp. 86-87) on the issue reviewed, there 
is a need for thorough studies on state responsibility for aviation terrorism.
The purpose of the publication is to outline the framework of holding 
states responsible for aviation terrorism and set out the grounds of the successful 
implementation of state responsibility for aviation terrorism. Hence, tasks are to 
address the key elements necessary for state responsibility to come into life and 
to provide key procedures of implementation of state responsibility for aviation 
terrorism. 
Presentation of the main material. Taking into consideration all the relevant 
characteristic features of this kind of international terrorism, for the purposes of this 
research, international aviation terrorism has been formulated as conduct or threat of 
conduct of a transnational offence or participation in it of a person that, by a ground 
attack, hijacking, an act of sabotage or suicide mission unlawfully, intentionally and 
violently endangers safety of or causes serious damage to any aviation facility, causes 
death or serious bodily injury to passengers, crew on board or gate agents with the 
purpose of intimidation of a population or compelling a government or international 
organization to do or to abstain from doing any act. 
In view of crucial differences between acts of terrorism conducted in peacetime 
and wartime, the present article focuses on the acts of aviation terrorism occurred 
in peacetime. 
Firstly, we will address the elements of state responsibility enshrined in 
Article 2 of the Articles on State Responsibility for Internationally Wrongful Acts 
(hereinafter – ILC Articles) elaborated on by the International Law Commission 
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(hereinafter – ILC). Secondly, we will touch upon ways of implementation of state 
responsibility.
To begin with, in order for a state to be held responsible for an act of aviation 
terrorism, this act should be looked at through lenses of attribution of it to a state 
and a breach of an international obligation of that state [4, Article 2]. 
An international obligation, as a normative rule, is primary in relation to the 
act, which, in turn, either may or may not be attributed to a state. Such normative 
rules are substantive rules of international law establishing rights and obligations 
for states involved in some activities on the international plane. Consequently, 
violations of such rules may give rise to state responsibility. Such obligations consist 
of two groups of state obligations – under general international law and under the 
counter-terrorism framework.
As regards the former group, it maintains international peace and security. In 
that regard, the most authoritative and well-regarded international instrument is, 
undoubtedly, the Charter of the United Nations (hereinafter – UN Charter). Some 
scholars (Alfred Verdross, Bruno Simma, Bardo Fassbender) even consider it to be 
a Constitution for International Community [5, p. 77].
In particular, Article 2 contains the core principles of international law that 
states should stick to. In fact, these are not only principles but also obligations 
further elaborated on by the United Nations General Assembly (hereinafter – 
UNGA) in Resolution 2625 (XXV) – Declaration on Principles of International 
Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States in accordance 
with the Charter of the United Nations – and accepted by the UN Member States. 
In view of these documents, the obligations relevant to the context of aviation 
terrorism are: 1) an obligation not to threat or use of force; 2) an obligation not 
to intervene in internal affairs of other states; 3) an obligation to suppress acts of 
aggression or other breaches of peace.
The prohibition of threat or use of force in international relations is a customary 
international law rule reflected in the UN Charter and UNGA Resolution 2625 
(XXV) [6, p. 97, para. 182, p. 99, para. 188, p. 101, para. 191]. In the context of 
this rule, the UNGA Resolution 2625 and the UNSC Resolution 748 (1992) have 
explicitly outlawed various forms of participation in international terrorism – 
organization, assistance, participation, instigation, acquiescence [7; 8, preamble].
The prohibition of intervention in matters within domestic jurisdiction is another 
customary rule proscribing organization, assistance, foment, financing, incitement 
or tolerance of terrorist activities [7; 9, p. 227, para. 162]. This principle reflects the 
right of a sovereign state to carry out its affairs without external interference and is 
of customary nature [6, p. 106, para. 202]. When specifying intervention in external 
or internal affairs of a state, the ICJ specified that the use of force in direct form 
(military action) and indirect form (support for terrorist activities) are cases of such 
an intervention [6, p. 108, para. 205].
The prohibition of acts of aggression, in its turn, does not explicitly mention acts 
of international terrorism. Nevertheless, aviation terrorism may amount either to a 
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breach of the peace or intervention in internal matters and within the meaning of 
aggression, could exist in the form of state sponsorship of terrorism [10, pp. 26-27], 
“the sending… of armed bands, groups, irregulars or mercenaries, which carry out acts 
of armed force…” [11, Article 3(g)]. For instance, the 9/11 attacks are considered 
acts of aggression while being acts of aviation terrorism [12, p. 81; 13, p. 141].
The latter group, dealing with the counter-terrorism framework, imposes specific 
obligations upon states. They are connected with a specific nature of aviation 
terrorism and match the performance needed from countries.
In particular, the conventions addressing aviation terrorism form the core of 
the counter-terrorism framework in civil aviation sphere. They are: Convention on 
Offences and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft – Tokyo Convention 
1963 (adopted 14 September 1963, entered into force 4 December 1969); Convention 
for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft – Hague Convention 1970 
(adopted 16 December 1970, entered into force 14 October 1971); Convention for 
the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation – Montreal 
Convention 1971 (adopted 23 September 1971, entered into force 26 January 
1973); Protocol on the Suppression of Unlawful Acts of Violence at Airports Serving 
International Civil Aviation – Montreal Protocol 1988 (adopted 24 February 1988, 
entered into force 6 August 1989); Convention on the Suppression of Unlawful 
Acts Relating to International Civil Aviation – Beijing Convention 2010 (adopted 
10 September 2010, entered into force 1 July 2018); Protocol Supplementary to the 
Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft – Beijing Protocol 2010 
(adopted 10 September 2010, entered into force 1 January 2018); Protocol to Amend 
the Convention on Offences and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft – 
Montreal Protocol 2014 (adopted 4 April 2014, not yet in force).
As regards obligations imposed by the aforementioned conventions, there are 
four types of them: 1) obligations to prevent acts of aviation terrorism; 2) obligations 
to punish perpetrators of acts of aviation terrorism; 3) obligations to cooperate 
(either in prevention or punishment); 4) obligation to settle disputes by peaceful 
means (in fact, provisions containing this obligation are compromissory clauses and 
are relevant for the implementation of state responsibility).
Prevention of acts of aviation terrorism is based upon the customary rule of 
international law formulated by the ICJ in the Corfu Channel case. It is an obligation 
for a state “not to allow knowingly its territory to be used for acts contrary to the 
rights of other states” [14, p. 22]. In other words, it requires due diligence from a 
state for it to avert any harm to other states originating from the territory of this 
state [15, pp. 140-141]. 
The duties of prevention are regarded as duties of conduct and not of result. 
Hence, application of best efforts of a state (due diligence in terrorism prevention) 
is more important than the provision of guarantees of a particular outcome of non-
occurrence of acts of terrorism.
Due to the vague wording of this obligation stipulated by the conventions 
(“States Parties shall … endeavour to take all practicable measures for the purpose 
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of preventing the offences…”), states have a wide margin of appreciation in choosing 
means at its disposal [15, p. 132] for non-tolerating acts of aviation terrorism. In 
addition, the UNSC and UNGA frameworks provide states with a roadmap of 
possible measures to be undertaken. For instance, the UNSC Resolution 1373 (2001) 
considers the exchange of information to constitute early warning of states and 
prevention of the commission of terrorist acts; effective border controls, control over 
the issuance of identity and travel documents, preventing of counterfeiting, forgery or 
fraudulent use of such documents it sees as measures to prevent the movement of 
terrorists [16, p. 2, para. 2(b)(g)].
Moreover, both UNGA and UNSC stressed the importance of non-acquiescence 
of terrorism in some way emanating from the territory of a state. In particular, in 
its Resolution 1373, the UNSC implied tolerating of aviation terrorism as passive 
support of it [16, p. 3, para. 6]. It should be noted that the toleration of terrorist 
activities (acquiescence and acceptance) does differ from the state’s failure to 
undertake all reasonable measures for the prevention of terrorism [15, p. 132]. Some 
scholars even suggest toleration of activities of terrorist groups in their territory 
as a state sponsorship in the form of omission [17]. In any event, it constitutes the 
breach of Article 2(4) of the UN Charter.  Specifically, the UNSC referred to it in 
the course as to the negative obligation “to refrain from … acquiescing in organized 
activities within its territory directed towards the commission of [terrorist] acts” 
(emphasis added) [8, preamble].
Hence, if a state does not prevent terrorism, in fact, it refuses to eliminate a 
terrorist threat emanating from its territory [18, p. 111].
Punishment of perpetrators of acts of aviation terrorism should take place regardless 
of identity and structure of offender (state, person, group of persons) [19, p. 13]. This 
obligation embraces obligations to criminalize offences considered as aviation terrorism 
and make them punishable by severe penalties, to establish jurisdiction and to ensure 
offender’s presence for the prosecution, to prosecute or extradite a perpetrator of an act 
of aviation terrorism and to grant a person under investigation a minimum standard of 
treatment. Predominantly, these issues are governed on a national level and, therefore, 
it is unpractical to address them in the course of this article.
Moreover, if a state provides a safe haven for perpetrators of a terrorist act 
following its commission, it may be brought to justice both for the failure to 
prosecute or extradite and for the failure to prevent subsequent attacks [15, p. 353].
Provisions on co-operation comprise those on mutual legal assistance. “The 
greatest measure of assistance” includes an exchange of information, assistance 
in obtaining evidence necessary for the proceedings [15, p. 125] and leaves wide 
discretion of conduct to states. Furthermore, bilateral and multilateral treaties on 
mutual legal assistance in criminal matters supplement existing informal cooperation 
mechanisms [20, p. 79]. 
Once it had been established that an act constituted a breach of an international 
obligation of a state, the question of attribution of that act to that state should be 
considered in order for state responsibility to take place.
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The attribution depends on a particular scenario present in a given situation [21, 
p. 4]. Hence, the scenario-specific aviation terrorism evidence may entail a type or 
types of attribution corresponding to Articles 4-11 of the ILC Articles. A state’s 
role (organizer, a supporter, controller, a non-preventive party, etc.) is a key point 
in this regard. We have elaborated on the types of attribution relevant for aviation 
terrorism depending on the state’s actions or omissions.
The category of actions covers a spectrum of state’s involvement in aviation 
terrorism: organization, support or control, assistance, acknowledgement or 
acceptance of conduct, adoption of excessive counter-terrorism measures. The 
category of omissions, in its turn, deals with the state’s failure to discharge obligations 
of prevention of acts of terrorism and of extradition or submission to prosecution 
individuals that are responsible for them. Therefore, in cases of non-prevention and 
non-punishment, the state organs’ failure to comply with its obligations will engage 
state responsibility. Consequently, in the cases of omissions, state organ’s conduct 
is to be under investigation (usually, under Article 4 of the ILC Articles). Thus, 
possible actions of a state are to be addressed.
A state’s active participation in an act of aviation terrorism comes first. In 
general, the assumption of a state’s control over its officials constitutes a basis for that 
state’s responsibility [21, p. 56]. Therefore, attribution to a state of the conduct of 
any state organ (Article 4 of the ILC Articles) is a rule of customary international 
law [22, p. 202, para. 385].
State organs may be either de jure [23, para. 1] or de facto [23, para. 2]. While 
the former are governed by Article 4 of the ILC Articles, the latter is covered by 
Article 8 (dealing with state’s support or control of perpetrators of a terrorist act; 
that is another type of state action considered below). 
In regard to de jure state organs, they are individual or collective entities which 
make up the organization of the State and act on its behalf” [24, p. 31]. Furthermore, 
as it has been defined in Article 7 of the ILC Articles, a state is responsible for the 
ultra vires conduct (excess of authority or contravention of instructions) of an organ 
if it acted in an official capacity [4, Article 7]. However, in cases of actions in a 
purely private capacity state responsibility will not be invoked [24, p. 64].
Nevertheless, in the context of terrorism, secret service agents act through covert 
operations. Therefore, such state organs may appear as nationals engaged in private 
conduct [10, p. 35] that falls within the “support or control” actions.
In fact, the state’s involvement in aviation terrorism through direction, support 
or control of private conduct is a widely discussed and complex aspect of attribution. 
This situation owes not only to the lack of precisely defined criteria for the 
attribution of conduct and case-specific circumstances but also to the lowered 
threshold of control established by the counter-terrorism framework.
In accordance with the customary law of international responsibility and Article 
8 of the ILC Articles, a state is responsible for acts of private individuals if it directed, 
controlled them [4, Article 8; 22, pp. 207-208, para. 398], issued instructions to them 
so that their acts constituted a breach of that state’s international obligations [22, p. 
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207, para. 397]. In this respect, the International Court of Justice (hereinafter – ICJ) 
and the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (hereinafter – 
ICTY) elaborated on several tests applicable when assessing the degree of state’s 
control over private actor’s conduct sufficient for the triggering of imputation of 
responsibility to that state. These are effective control test (ICJ, the Nicaragua case 
[6, pp. 64-65, para. 115]) and overall control test (ICTY, the Tadić case (the overall 
control test) [25, p. 62, para. 145]). 
For the purposes of state responsibility, the ICJ in the Bosnia Genocide case 
has rejected the overall control test as stretching “almost to breaking point” [22, p. 
210, para. 406]. The effective control test, in its turn, was considered as a too strict 
one in the context of terrorism [10, p. 42].
In addition to that, terrorism is lex specialis providing that the attribution of acts 
of terrorism is based on a state’s support, harbouring or tolerating the perpetrators 
of terrorist acts [23, para. 12]. Hence, the scope of state responsibility for private 
conduct has broadened significantly [26, p. 83].
It owes to the actions having been undertaken in response to aviation terrorism. 
Namely, the threshold of control formulated for the purposes of the law of state 
responsibility has been lowered dramatically. It is because the extent of permissible 
action used for combating terrorism depends on the harbouring state’s level of 
support provided. If there is a mere acquiescence, only actions necessary to deal 
with the terrorist threat may be undertaken. On the contrary, if there is a provision 
of significant support, personnel and facilities involved may be subjected to an 
attack [18, p. 112]. Hence, the lowered standards are of great importance not for 
the definition of whether private actors were de facto agents of a state but rather of 
state’s complicity in the unlawful conduct [26, p. 89].
This brings us to the consideration of Chapter IV of the ILC Articles on the 
responsibility of a state in connection with the act of another state. In particular, if 
there are aid, assistance, direction, control over the commission of an internationally 
wrongful state, or coercion, a state doing that will be held responsible [4, Articles 
16-18]. The relaxed standards bring state’s complicity in private conduct into 
proximity with that one in public conduct (that is, in accordance with the Articles 
16-18 of the ILC Articles, significantly rank below the private one in hardness). 
Thus, there is a recast of private conduct [26, p. 90].
Following the explosion of Pan Am Flight 103 over Lockerbie (Scotland), the 
United Kingdom, the US and France made a declaration submitting that state 
responsibility should take place where a state has directly or indirectly participated 
in terrorist actions. By indirect participation they meant “harbouring, training, 
providing facilities, arming or providing financial support, or any form of protection” 
(emphasis added) [27, p. 3].
The UNSC upheld this vision and stressed that “those responsible for aiding, 
supporting or harbouring the perpetrators, organizers and sponsors of these 
[terrorist attacks] acts will be held accountable” (emphasis added) [28, p. 1, para. 
3]. Albeit the Resolution cited provides no information regarding the types of 
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personalities that may be brought to justice, to our mind, states are implied to 
be responsible.
Thus, the framework of international terrorism has been formulating its own 
“harbour or support” rule [26, p. 92] for the attribution of terrorist act conducted by 
private actors to a state. 
In the context of aviation terrorism, states may also acknowledge and adopt 
someone’s conduct (governed by Article 11 of the ILC Articles); some insurrectional 
movements that are to become new governments of states or new states may also 
acknowledge and adopt private conduct (Article 10 of the ILC Articles allows 
attribution of such conduct to a state).
Furthermore, when responding to terrorism and setting the counter-terrorism 
framework, states may adopt excessive measures. They influence human rights 
through the criminalization of some legitimate activities (expressions of opinion, 
lawful protests), prevention (use of force by law enforcement officers), restrictions. 
Moreover, issues of insurance of fair trial and protection of human rights during 
prosecution and detention (for instance, cases of indefinite incarceration of suspects, 
disregard of normal standards of proof in criminal proceedings, sanctioning of use of 
brutal interrogation techniques) are subjects of concern [29, pp. 95–96]. Excessive 
counter-terrorism measures, therefore, might threaten democracy [30, p. 81] and 
affect both human rights and the rule of law.
Hence, the issue of the state’s excess of powers should be reviewed in the 
framework of international human rights law. Thus, a state is to be responsible under 
the rules of international human rights treaties and international mechanisms for 
the protection of human rights. They stand out of counter-terrorism framework and, 
consequently, are not covered by the present article.
Finally, we would like to briefly outline the key ways of implementation of state 
responsibility.
Albeit state responsibility does not depend on its invocation, injured states may 
undertake actions to secure the performance of the obligations of cessation and 
reparation from the responsible state [31, p. 254]. To this end, they are allowed to 
invoke responsibility and/or to refer to countermeasures.
The invocation of responsibility takes a form of a response to an internationally 
wrongful act. It may comprise of a mere reminder of the need of the fulfilment of an 
obligation (in forms of protest, consultations), or an official notice of a claim to the 
responsible state [24, p. 280] with the specification of the conduct in question that 
should be taken and possible forms of reparation [4, Article 43]. 
Moreover, injured states can settle the dispute by peaceful means. For instance, 
the compromissory clauses of the counter-terrorism conventions’ on civil aviation 
listed above do hold the dispute settlement power in either reference to negotiations 
of submission the case to arbitration or, if the arbitration fails within six months, 
no the International Court of Justice (Convention on Offences and Certain Other 
Acts Committed On Board Aircraft (1963) – Article 24(1); Convention on the 
Suppression of Unlawful Acts Relating to International Civil Aviation (2010) – 
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Article 20(1), etc.). In addition, states may raise questions of aviation terrorism 
before the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO).
The ICJ has put an emphasis on “the right, and indeed the duty” to respond to 
acts of violence against its population within norms and principles of international 
law [32, p. 195, para. 141]. By this, it reaffirmed the opportunity to refer to 
countermeasures. Strictly speaking, there are several types of such measures: measures 
under general international law and measures under secondary rules on state 
responsibility.
General international law provides retorsions as lawful measures (for example, the 
suspension of air services agreements between the Bonn Declaration participants and 
Afghanistan (within the terms of that agreements) is a retorsion referred to in response 
to Afghanistan’s refusal to extradite hijackers of the Pakistan International Airline 
(PIA) flight in 1981 [10, p. 193–196]), self-defence (one of the most remarkable 
illustrations of the use of force addressing aviation terrorism is the United States’ 
recourse to the use of force in response to international terrorism after the 9/11 
attacks) and the UNSC’s enforcement (for instance, the UNSC had established a 
sanctions regime for Al-Qaida and the Taliban by Resolution 1267 (1999)).
Measures under secondary rules on state responsibility, in their turn, are addressed 
in the ILC Articles (Article 22 and Chapter II of Part Two). They provide criteria 
that should be met in order for the conduct to be recognized as a countermeasure 
(and, hence, the conduct, which would otherwise be in breach of the international 
obligations of the State concerned, in that case would be lawful). In particular, 
1) proportionate [33, p. 56, para. 85; 4, Article 51] countermeasures should be 
adopted 2) responding to a previous internationally wrongful act of another State 
and 3) directed against it [33, pp. 55–56, para. 83; 4, Article 49(1)] 4) after the call 
upon an offender to discontinue the wrongful conduct or to make reparation for 
it [33, p. 56, para.84; 4, Article 52(2)]. They do not terminate or suspend treaty 
relations between the parties concerned [24, p. 305; 4, Article 49(3)]. Thus, as soon 
as the State responsible for an internationally wrongful act has complied with its 
obligations, the countermeasures should be ceased [4, Article 53]. 
For example, In the case of the Rome and Vienna attacks in 1985 year, the United 
States (as an injured state) imposed on Libya (believed of having provided support 
for the attacks and sanctuary to terrorists) countermeasures in the form of economic 
sanctions: prohibition of trade and certain business transactions with Libya by US 
persons, a freeze on the Libyan Government’s assets. These measures were contrary to 
the agreements between the states and, thus, were countermeasures [10, pp. 198–199].
Conclusions. To sum up, bringing to justice states involved in international 
terrorism in aviation sphere is a real deterrent to the process of spreading of this 
crime over the world. In that respect, both primary and secondary rules on state 
responsibility are significant: the former provides a framework for states’ actions, the 
latter prescribes consequences of actions breaching international obligations of states. 
The article addressed the key principles and concepts necessary for and delineated 
ways of the implementation of state responsibility for aviation terrorism.
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Привлечение государств к ответственности за авиационный терроризм 
В статье рассматриваются особенности привлечения государств к ответственности за 
их причастность к терроризму в сфере гражданской авиации. Определяются и анализируются 
основные обязательства, налагаемые на государства в вопросах, связанных с авиационным терро-
ризмом, характерные особенности присвоения акта авиационного терроризма государству и спо-
собы осуществления ответственности государства.
Ключевые слова: международный терроризм; авиационный терроризм; терроризм в сфере 
гражданской авиации; международная ответственность государств; нарушения международ-
ных обязательств государства; присвоение международно-противоправных деяний государству; 
имплементация международной ответственности государства.
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